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law, if there is a plea of guilty or finding of guilty, it is not
necessary for the prosecuting attorney or his deputy to be
present in order to have the five dollar fee taxed in favor of
the prosecutor for the use of the county.
Disposition of Property Seized by Warrant. Chapter 188
34
is amendatory in character and changes the previous statute
by requiring immediate delivery to the sheriff of the county
by the justice of the peace, judge or officer having custody
of property or things seized under a warrant executed by
the seizure. Failure to deliver the property or things seized
to the sheriff is a misdemeanor and is punished by a fine in
any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars35
EMINENT DOMAIN
Chapter 39 provides that: (1) Municipalities or other
political subdivisions of adjoining states may acquire land
in Indiana for the purpose of operating airports or other
aerial navigation facilities; (2) Indiana municipalities and
political subdivisions are empowered to acquire land in adjoining states for such uses; (3) The municipalities and political subdivisions of adjoining states may cooperate with
those of Indiana in establishing and maintaining joint facilities. Section 2 of the act, granting a municipality or political
subdivision of an adjoining state the power of eminent domain in acquiring lands in Indiana, raises a serious constitutional question.' Whether the operation of Section 2 of
the instant act in fact affords a benefit to the people of Indiana determines the validity of the taking as a "public use"
within the meaning of accepted constitutional construction.
The exercise of eminent domain is an essential power of
2
sovereignty, and is limited, not conferred, by the constitution.
33.
34.
1.

2.

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 9-604.
There seems to be a commendable policy for the change. Punishing public officers for failing to perform their duties efficiently
should help improve local administration.
Ind. Acts 1947, c. 39, §2. "Such municipality or other political
subdivision of an adjoining state shall have all the rights, privileges, and duties of like municipalities and political subdivisions
of this state, including the right to exercise the right of eminent
domain in accordance with the laws of this state as to property
not devoted to public use. . ." It is clear that the last phrase
must be read to mean "property not already devoted to public use,"
as public use is a definite limitation in Indiana. See note 4, infra.
Great Western Nat. Gas etc. Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557,
565, 66 N, E. 765, 768 (1903).
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It has been characterized as a "very high and dangerous
right," the exercise of which will be carefully scrutinized by
the courts.- Strictly eminent domain seems to be a power
rather than a right; however, since owners of land are subjected to no duties by exercise of eminent domain; they simply have no right to interfere with the process. Among the
chief limitations upon the exercise of this sovereign power is
the requirement that property be taken only for a public use.
This limitation is in force in Indiana, though the words "public
use" do not appear in the present constitution. 4 The legislative declaration that a use is a public one is subject to
review by the courts.,
The difficulty in the present act is not that the power is
exercised by a foreign municipality. "It is not the instrumentality employed for operating the public use, but the use
itself, that satisfies the constitution." 6
No valid analogies can be drawn from the cases in which
the power was exercised for the benefit of the federal government. There, a completely disparate question is involved:
First, the individual states exercise their sovereignty over
entirely separate lands, while the United States has concurrent sovereignty with each state over the lands within the
state borders; secondly, the theory that a taking for the benefit of the people of the United States would necessarily include a benefit to the people of the state wherein the land
lies. Two early but vigorous decisions held that a state has
no power to condemn land for use by the federal government,
unless a direct and substantial benefit accrues to the people of
the state.7 The more recent cases have limited those deciKinney v. Citizens Water & Light Co., 173 Ind. 252, 255, 90 N. E.
129, 130 (1909).
4. Great Western Nat. Gas etc. Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557,
566, 11 66 N.E. 765, 768 (1903).
5. Great Western Nat. Gas etc. Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557,
566, 66 N.E. 765, 768 (1903); Logan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372,
24 N.E. 135 (1889).
6. Columbia Waterworks Co. v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 702 (1899).
The case concerns the exercise of eminent domain by a foreign
municipal corporation.
7. People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep.
94 (1871).
In holding that the State of Michigan was without
power to condemn land for the use of the United States in erecting
a lighthouse, Judge Cooley voiced the now classic doctrine, which
was reiterated and approved in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367
(1876): "The eminent domain in any sovereignty exists only for
its own purposes; and to furnish machinery to the general govern3.
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sions so severely, however, that they are little more than a
slight embarrassment to courts today. The rule now seems
to be that exercise of eminent domain by a state, if otherwise
valid, is not defeated because the power is exercised for the
benefit of the federal government.8 It is interesting to note,
however, that the courts still speak of a proper "local and
municipal character."",
No case has been found which held that the power of
condemnation could be exercised solely for the benefit of
people of adjoining or foreign states. The converse has been
accepted as a self-evident proposition."0 In addition strong
secondary authority supports the impossibility of exercising
the power of eminent domain where no benefits accrue to the
people of the state wherein the lands are situate. 1 ment under and by means of which it is to appropriate land for
national objects is not among the ends contemplated in the creation
of the state governments." And in Darlington v. United States,
82 Pa. 882 (1876), the court, after citing this passage, adds:
"The foundation of the right of eminent domain is necessity. The
reason utterly fails when one sovereignty proceeds to take land
for the use of another sovereignty."
8. Delfeld v. Tulsa, 191 Okla. 541, 181 P. 2d 754 (1942); Fishel v.
Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P. 2d 286 (1940). And see Note,
143 A.L.R. 1040, and numerous cases there collected.
9. Fishel v. Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P. 2d 236 (1940). "Where
a state, or a municipality under its authorization, seeks to take
land under the right of eminent domain for a lawful, local, state
or municipal purpose, the circumstance that such land is later to
be turned over to the United States to better effectuate the public
object of the taking, is no valid objection to the condemnation."
A, case growing out of the same facts, McNichols v. Denver, 101
Colo. 316, 74 P. 2d 99 (1937), went off on the fact that the proposed
project ". . .possessed the necessary local and municipal character
to empower the city to participate to the extent contemplated."
Though the latter case did not involve the condemnation question,
it clearly establishes the local public use, and was cited for that
purpose in the Fishel case. Both cases distinguished People ex
rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94 (1871),
supra, note 7, as being a question of an exclusive federal use.
Via v. State Commission on Conservation, etc. of Virginia, 9 F.
Supp. 556 (1935), infra, note 15, was cited as authority for this
construction of the Trombley rule.
10. Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir, & Irr. Co.,
21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pac. 43, Ann. Cas. 1915D 1206 (1913); Salisbury
In the following cases,
Mills v. Forsaith, 57 N.H. 124 (1876).
the court treated the proposition that there must be some benefit
to the people of the state in which the land lay as evident, but
found such a benefit in fact: Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv.
Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 32Z (1934); Washington Water Power
Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 ]Vac. 682 (1911). And see Note,
90 A.L.R. 1035 ('1934). But cf. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N.E. 1062 (1891).
11. 1 Nichols, "Eminent Domain" §29 (2d ed. 1917). "One state cannot
take or authorize the taking of property situated within its limits
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Generally, it appears that the relative quantity of benefit to the inhabitants of the state in which the lands are located is not material. But it seems to be established that
some direct advantage must accrue to the state or at least to
a few of its inhabitants.12 Although cases exist which have
allowed -one state to exercise eminent domain in another
state," it has been uniformly founded upon some theory of
direct benefit to the persons living in the state in which the
lands are located.14 Collateral and incidental economic benefor the use of another state. Any employment of the power of
eminent domain for other purposes than to enable the government
of the state to exercise and give effect to its proper authority,
effectuate the purposes of its creation and carry out the policy
of its laws could not be rested upon the justification and basis
which underlie the power, and has never received the sanction of
the courts. Accordingly, it would seem that if a municipality was
located close to the boundary of another state, and the only available property for satisfying the necessity and convenience of its
people for such purposes as a water supply, a sewer outlet, or
a park was situated across the boundary line, it would be impossible to take the necessary land by eminent domain even with the
consent of the state in which it was situated, for the legislature
of neither state would have the power to grant the requisite
authority-in one case because the property sought to be taken
was not within its jurisdiction, and in the other because the use
for which it was sought to take the property was not one for
which it lay within its powers to invoke the exercise of eminent
domain."
1 Lewis, "Eminent Domain" §310 (3d ed. 1909). "The public
use for which property may be taken is a public use within the
state from which the power is derived."
12. 18 Am. Jur. "Eminent Domain" § 20 (p. 646), and cases there
cited. "Generally speaking, it appears from the eases that the
relative amount of direct benefits accruing respectively inside and
outside the state is not material. But it is apparently settled
that property cannot be condemned by virtue of the state's power
of eminent domain if no direct benefit from .its proposed use is
to accrue to the state in whicl; it is located or to at least a few
inhabitants thereof. An indirect benefit to the people of a state,
such as results from the industrial activities, population, and wealth
of a neighboring state, is not sufficient to justify the taking of
private property within the borders of one state for the benefit
of the people of another." Cases cited notes 13 and 14, infra.
13. Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 Pac.
682 (1911); Columbia Waterworks v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So.
702 (1899).
14. See e.g., Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir, &
Irr. Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pac. 43, (1913) Ann. Cas. 1915D 1206;
a square holding that the Wyoming Legislature could not authorize
the taking of lend in Wyoming for the sole purpose of irrigating
lands located in the State of Colorado. The court said: "It will be
noticed that in the cases cited it was deemed necessary to sustain
the exercise of the power that the particular use have some substantial relation to a public purpose and the public interest and
welfare in the state wherein the land to be taken is located. And
this thought runs through all the cases discussing the question of
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fits do not seem to be sufficient. 15
But an act will not be invalidated simply because a direct benefit will accrue to the people of a foreign state, where
the exercise of the power is primarily for the people of the
state in which the land is located. The most recent Indiana
case touching upon the point is Shedd v. Northern Indiana
Public Service Company.' In that case, a power company
sought to condemn lands for a right-of-way for their lines.
Although some of the power was to be sold in an adjoining
state, it was held that such incidental benefits to the people
of the adjoining state would not defeat the right where the
major purpose of the condemnation was for the benefit of
the people of the State of Indiana. The question was there
stated to be: "Is the use of a public use within this state,
and does it serve the interests of the people of this state?"'
Though the question was answered affirmatively on the facts,
the court quoted with approval from the opinion in Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters,18 including the statement

15.

16.
17.
18.

public use, or a use permitting or justifying the taking of private
property by eminent domain."
Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir, & Irr. Co.,
21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pac. 43, Ann. Cas. 1915D 1206 (1913); Salisbury
Mills v. Forsaith, 57 N.H. 124 (1876); People ex rel. Trombley v.
Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94 (1871); Wooster v. Great
Falls Mfg. Co., 39 Me. 246 (1855).
In the Salisbury case, the
learned judge indulged in some very biting satire as to the value
of having such a thriving commonwealth as Massachusetts to the
south of New Hampshire, but refused to allow New Hampshire
land to be taken to further the prosperity of her southerly sister.
Indeed, it would not seem necessary that the problem of incidental benefits be considered in the instant case, since the act
does not proceed on any theory of benefit to the people of Indiana.
At least this is so if the doctrine of Judge Cooley in the Trombley
case, supra, may be considered authoritative. In answer to the
contention that the interest of the state in coastwise shipping would
be furthered by aiding the United States in establishing lighthouses, he replied, "But the act does not proceed on any theory
of state interest. It assumes that the taking is to be for the United
States exclusively. It is not necessary for us to consider, therefore, what might be the result were the theory of the act different."
This "theory of the act" concept has been the basis for most
subsequent distinguishing of the Trombley case, and is well illustrated by Via v. State Commission on Conservation, etc. of Virginia, 9 F. Supp. 556 (1935). The Virginia act in question authorized a taking for the establishment of a national park, and proceeded on the theory of a direct benefit to the people of Virginia.
Fishel v. Denver, 106 Colo. 5761 108 P. 2d 236 (1940) used much
the same device, and relied on the Via case. See note 9, supra.
206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322 (1934).
Id. at 46, 188 N.E. at 326.
19 Iaaho 595, 115 Pac. 682 (1911).
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that "Condemnation could evidently not be had in this state
for the purpose of serving alone a public use in another state
. . . ". This would seem to indicate that unless some benefit to the people of Indiana can be established, the section in
controversy is of dubious constitutionality.
It is difficult to predict with any accuracy just what is
needed to constitute a so-called "direct" benefit, and what
is merely indirect or collateral.- 9 The cases furnish only imperfect analogies, since they have been generally concerned
with the furnishing of a commodity, such as water,20 electrical
power, 21 or natural gas, 22 both within and without the state.23
Where a commodity is furnished, whatever benefit is received
is clearly of a direct nature. Where a service or facility is
concerned, as is the case with airports, the direct nature of
benefits conferred is not so apparent. The use of the airport by an occasional Indiana pilot might be considered di19.

20.
21.

22.

23.

The following cases found only collateral benefits: Grover Irr. &
Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir, & Irr. Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131
Pac. 43, (1913 Ann. Cas. 1915D 1206 (hiring of workers, purchase
of supplies, probability of the establishment of a town in the home
state at the site of the proposed headgate); Salisbury Mills v.
Forsaith, 57 N.H. 124 (1876) (promotion of manufacturing in
neighboring state); People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich.
471, 9 Am. Rep. 94 (1871) (furtherance of coastwise navigation);
Wooster v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 39 Me. 246 (1855) (development
of commerce and manufacturing in neighboring state).
Columbia Waterworks v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. .702, (1899)
(furnishing of water supply to two municipalities in home state
and one without).
Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E. 322
(1934); Rogers v. Toccoa Elec. Power Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S.E.
272 (1927); Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho
595, 115 Pac. 682 (1911).
Carnegie Nat. Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S.E. 3 (1913)
(right of condemnation not defeated by fact that most of the gas
was to be sold outside the state, where condemnor averred willingness to serve all within state who applied and were within reach
of its lives.
Perhaps the decision most nearly in point as involving a service
is In re Townsend, 39 N.Y. 171 (1868). The New York court
found a direct benefit to the citizens of New York in a canal which
ran along the border of, but did not enter, the state.
Latinette v. St. Louis, 120 C.C.A. 638, 201 Fed. 676 (C.C.A.
7th, 1912), infra, note 24, involves a taking of lands in Illinois
by the Missouri municipality, for use as a bridgehead for a highway across the Mississippi. Though this is clearly the same sort
of occasional direct benefit to the citizens of the home state as is
involved in an airport question, the case is simply not in point,
since the power of condemnation was not derived from any state
authorization, but from the broad commerce power of Congress.
Thus the question of whether a state itself may authorize a
taking of lands of its citizens for such a purpose is left open.
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The mere promotion of commerce is more conjectural,

24
and has, at least in some aspects, been held only collateral.

Section 4 provides that the entire act is inapplicable unless an adjoining state wishing to take advantage of the act
grants reciprocal rights to Indiana municipalities. This would
seem to add little to constitutionality; it begs the question.
In the leading case involving such reciprocal state laws, their
purpose was effectuated. 25 But the decision was in the foreign court, which admitted that the effectiveness of the agreement depended upon the constitution of the state wherein
the lands were located. Though they then construed that
constitution as authorizing the taking under the reciprocal
state laws, the case is certainly open to attack as lacking both
in sound rationale and authority. 28 In any case, the problem
is still one of constitutionality of the reciprocal laws.
As an attempt to guarantee a benefit to the people of
Indiana, Section 4 may be of some aid. But upon analysis, no
benefit is clearly established by the section. It is no answer
to a man in one part of Indiana, complaining of an unconstitutional taking of his lands, to tell him that persons in another part of the state might someday wish to build an airport in, say, Illinois. It would not appear to be within the
province of the legislature to determine that it might authorize unconstitutional takings of land in this state, so long as
the people of this state were free likewise to invade the rights
of the people of the adjoining state.
24.

Cases cited note 19, supra.

25.

Langdon v. Walla Walla, 112 Wash. 446, 193 Pac. 1

(1920).

Washington and Oregon passed reciprocal laws, each permitting
municipalities of the other to condemn lands within the borders
of the state foreign to it, for the purpose of establishing and operating waterworks. The City of Walla Walla, Washington, sought
to condemn lands in Oregon under authority of these laws. Held:

The condemnation is valid.

Though the validity depends upon the

constitution of Oregon, the Washington court found nothing in

26.

the Oregon Constitution to invalidate the statutes.
The majority opinion cites Grover Irr. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch,
Reservoir, & Irr. Co., 21 Wyom. 204, 131 Pac. 43, (1913) Ann. Cas.

1915D 1206 with approval, but found that it was decided upon the
ground that no Wyoming law authorized a taking in Wyoming

by a political subdivision of an adjoining state, i.e., that there

had been no special legislative action. This is simply a misstatement of the holding in the Grover case, as was pointed out by

Main, J., in his dissenting opinion. Judge Main further pointed
out that the majority relied on only two cases, neither of which
was strictly in point. In re Townsend, 39 N.Y. 171 (1868), has

always been treated as a "direct benefit" case; and Reddal v.

Bryan, 14 Md. 444, 74 Am. Dec. 550 (1859) went off on the
historical unity of Maryland and the District of Columbia.
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Though, as has been shown, the eminent domain clause
of Section 2 may well be invalid through failure to guarantee
a benefit sufficient to support the public use necessary to a
valid exercise of eminent domain, the invalidation of- the
entire act by no means necessarily results. 27 By limiting the
act to its valid applications, a great many of its objects could
be consummated. In addition to this, at least three other possibilities for achieving the objects of the act are available:
1. The foreign municipalities could join in the operation of air navigation facilities with municipalities of this
state. Though this method is provided by the act, and might
be authorized thereby if the act were limited to its valid
applications, the provision occurs in the doubtful Section 2.2,
Should the entire section be invalidated because of its inseparable character, this provision would also fall. But it is not
certain that a statute would be necessary for such joint action. Incidental benefits to the people of adjoining states are
not fatal to the exercise of the power of condenmation in this
state, where there is a clear intent to confer a benefit upon
the people of this state and where execution of the proposal
would evidently result in such benefit. 29
2. Secondly, it seems clear that Congress can authorize
a municipality as its agent, to take and operate facilities in
27.

2 Sutherland, "Statutes and Statutory Construction" §§2401-2419
(3d ed., Horack, 1943), especially §2417, on separability where part
of the act is invalid as to part of the possible applications. Though
there is some conflict, Indiana will in general allow limitation of
the act to its valid applications; this is a logical corollary of the

presumption of validity.

The rule is well stated in Keane v.

Remy, 201 Ind. 286, 168 N.E. 10 (1929), citing State v. Barrett,

172 Ind. 169, 87 N.E. 7 (1909): "Where only a part of a legislative act violates the constitution and is judicially declared void,
and the remainder of the act is complete in itself and capable of
execution according to the legislative intent and wholly independent of that which is judicially determined to be unconstitu-

tional, the remaining part of the act will be sustained." The converse is also true. Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 181, 110 N.E.
987, 990 (1915) Ann. Cas. 1918E 68. No reason is apparent why
the foreign municipalities should not be permitted to acquire lands
in this state by purchase, though they be denied the power of
condemnation. The statute here would thus appear to be separable.

28.

Ind. Acts 1947, c. 39, 92.

"Such municipality or other political

subdivision of an adjoining state shall have. . .the power jointly
with municipalities in this state to acquire, establish, construct, own,
control, lease, equip, imprbve, maintain, and operate airports or

29.

landing fields, or other air navigation facilities." The portion of
the section indicated by ellipses is quoted supra, note 1, and
contains the controverted eminent domain clause.
Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 206 Ind. 35, 188 N.E.
322 (1934).
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adjoining states, for any purpose for which Congress can
authorize the exercise of eminent domain.8o It would appear
that airports clearly come under the commerce power of Con3
gress. '
3. It is possible that the states might by compact authorize a joint commission or authority to exercise eminent
82
domain, for the joint benefit of the peoples of both states.
In such case, of course, the operation would be theoretically
aimed at a benefit for the people of the state wherein the
land lies, and the precise question would not arise. Even so,
it is possible that such compact would require the approval
3
of Congress. 3
ESTATES, FIDUCIARIES AND GUARDIANSHIP
ESTATES UNDER $500-Chapter 124 provides an alternate method of settlement for estates under $500.1 The
Act permits a bank or person, 2 indebted to or having funds
not exceeding $500 which are the property of the estate of a
deceased person, to pay these funds to the clerk of the circuit

court of the county in which the deceased resided at death.3
30.

31.
32.

Latinette v. St. Louis, 120 C.C.A. 638, 201 Fed. 676 (C.C.A_ 7th,
1912). The court upheld-an act of Congress which authorized the
city of St. Louis, Missouri, to take lands in Illinois for use as a
terminus of a bridge across the Mississippi River.
Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §§171-184
(1940).
The statute creating the Port of New York Authority (N.Y.
Laws 1921, c. 154) seems to present a clear'picture of the operation
of compacts between states and the methods by which they are
reached. It will be noted, however, that the act of the New York
Legislature provides for the cooperation of the two states concerned, with New York retaining a substantial measure of control, and receiving a clear and direct benefit from the operation
of the Authority.
In City of New York v. Wilcox, et al., 189 N.Y.S. 724, 115
Misc. Rep. 351 (1921), the act was held valid because it purported
to operate only within constitutional limitations. The court said,
"It is obvious ...

that the State of New York has parted with none

of sovereign rights, nor relinquished the control over any property
belonging to the people of New York."
33. The New York Act of 1921, supra, note 26, was made with the sanction of Congress. Further discussion of compacts between states
is beyond the scope of this note.
1. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 124, §8, so provides. For previous procedure see
Ind. Acts 1881, c. 45, §193, et seq., as amended, Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §6-1701 et seq.
2. Id. §1, ". . .including without limitation thereon, the state or a
municipal corporation..

3.

Ibid.

